manner consistent with this hypothesis. The second explanation, the Presidentally-centered crisis theory, claims the RTAA was part of Franklin Roosevelts response to the Great Depression, expected to expand export markets for U.S. products, and that Congress agreed to the delegation because of the economic crisis created by the Depression and Roosevelts strong political leadership. An examination of the historic record demonstrates that the crisis explanation is only partially correct. The second main goal of this article is to expand upon an underemphasized portion of the explanation for the delegation. Legislators supported the RTAA not only in the hope it would ameliorate the economic crisis or because Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, asked them to, but also because Democrats expected the RTAA to better protect their preferred low tariff policy from reversal by future Republican congressional majorities than the system of omnibus tariff-setting had. Indeed, Democrats hoped the RTAA would institutionalize low tariffs, as the evidence presented here illustrates. This article describes the three main structural features of the RTAA that were expected to contribute most significantly to trade liberalization, after reviewing existing explanations for the RTAA.
Revisiting the Lesson and Crisis Hypotheses
Numerous explanations for the RTAA have been advanced, but two have been particularly influential.
3 First, the lesson hypothesis focuses on legislators learning from what have long been widely accepted as the consequences of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, one of the most infamous examples of congressional logrolling. Under it, the average tariff rate on dutiable imports rose to 59 percent, one of the highest U.S. tariffs ever. 4 The tariff took a year and a half to usher through the Republican-controlled Congress and contained specific tariff schedules for more than twenty thousand items. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff was further attacked for initiating a wave of retaliatory tariffs against the United States. 5 From 1929 to 1933, U.S. exports fell from $488 million to $120 million; imports fell from $368 million to $96 million; and world trade fell from $35 billion to $12 billion. 6 In addition, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff has been accused of turning a recession into the Great Depression. 7 The disastrous economic consequences of the tariff were widely believed to have contributed to the defeat of the Republican party in the 1932 elections. 8 According to the lesson hypothesis, Congress realized it was politically incapable of passing rational trade legislation and relinquished control of trade policy. 9 Fortunately for students of the RTAA, the lesson hypothesis contains an implicit prediction about congressional voting on the RTAA. There were ninety-five legislators who were theoretically capable of demonstrating the learning implied by the lesson hypothesis. These were the legislators who voted yea on the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff and who were also continuing members of Congress in 1934. Of these ninety-five legislators, only nine learned in the manner suggested by the lesson hypothesis by voting yea on the RTAA. Moreover, Democratic legislators exhibited considerably greater learning ability than their Republican counterparts: seven of the nine Democrats in a position to learn did so, in contrast to only two of the eighty-six Republicans (Table 1) . Republicans failure to demonstrate learning is particularly puzzling since it was the Republican Party that was identified with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff and that suffered the severe electoral defeat in 1932. Of course, the true learners may have been the Republican legislators defeated in the 1932 elections. Alternatively, the continuing Republican legislators of 1934 may have learned that their seats were unequivocally safe, since they had survived the 1932 election and thus had no reason to alter their tariff preferences. However, the lesson hypothesis attributes learning to continuing members of the 1934 Congress to describe support for the RTAA and the voting record clearly undermines the lesson hypothesis. Moreover, any explanation of the RTAA must account for why congressional Democrats in particular were willing to delegate tariff-setting authority to the President, since Democrats alone supported the legislation, a fact not made clear by the lesson hypothesis treatment of Congress as a unitary actor. The crisis explanation sheds some light on Democratic legislators incentive to delegate trade policymaking authority to the President, but it, too, is incomplete. The crisis theory explains the RTAA as an extraordinary response to the grave economic crisis posed by the Great Depressionone part of Roosevelts economic recovery program. 12 Specifically, the reciprocity requirement of the RTAA was intended to open foreign markets to U.S. products and thus help America export its way out of the Depression. The RTAA expanded export markets by shifting U.S. tariff-setting from a unilateral system, in which American tariff reductions did not have to be met by reductions on the part of its trading partners, to a bilateral system, in which U.S. tariff reductions had to be matched by its trading partners. Moreover, crisistheory proponents point to Roosevelts landslide electoral victory as evidence that any legislation Roosevelt sought, particularly early in his administration, he obtained from a complacent Congress. While the crisis of the Depression and Roosevelts strong leadership of the party no doubt contributed to Democrats willingness to pass the RTAA, solving the economic crisis of the Depression was not the sole reason for legislative support of the RTAA. Moreover, the crisis explanation overlooks the conflict over trade policy within the Roosevelt administration between economic nationalists such as Assistant Secretary of State Raymond Moley and Foreign Trade Adviser George Peek and internationalists such as Secretary of State Hull. Indeed, Roosevelt was initially opposed to the RTAA. What the crisis explanation also fails to recognize is that the RTAA was good political strategy for Democrats in that it helped provide durability to their preferred low tariffs, in addition to being good economic policy in that it did significantly expand export markets for U.S. products. Last, the crisis theory raises a final question: Why hadnt earlier Congresses responded to prior economic depressions by making as sweeping a delegation of tariff-setting authority as the 73d Congress did with the RTAA?
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Related to the crisis theory in its focus on Executive-branch initiative and congressional passivity is the international system explanation for the RTAA. This theory maintains that Roosevelt and Hull persuaded Congress to relinquish tariff-setting authority because Executive branch control of foreign economic policy could be used to pursue U.S. international political goals. 14 While the United States did pursue broad geopolitical goals with the RTAA during the 1930s, the RTAA was more heavily used in this manner after 1947, when Congress broadened Presidential authority under the RTAA to allow negotiation of multilateral trade agreements and U.S. participation in and leadership of the GATT began. 15 Moreover, by focusing exclusively on the international policy benefits of the RTAA, the international system explanation fails to recognize that the RTAA simultaneously advanced both an international political goal of the Executive branch and a domestic policy goal of congressional Democrats. This is partly the result of focusing solely on Hulls role as Secretary of State, thus overlooking how his lengthy tenure as a Democratic member of Congress influenced his trade policy preferences. I bring this more sharply into focus below.
Expanding the Explanation for Congressional Democrats
Support of the RTAA Two interrelated features of tariff-setting became deeply problematic for Democrats during the postCivil War period. First, under the system of legislative tariff-setting, the ability to set rates, or to alter rates set by political opponents, depended on unified political control of the federal government. However, between 1867 and 1932, Democrats wielded unified political control for only four of thirty-three Congresses. Second, since the postCivil War period was one of Republican political hegemony, in the rare instances when Democrats were politically able to enact tariff legislation (the 1894 Wilson-Gorman Tariff and the 1913 Underwood Tariff), their low rates were swiftly overturned when Republicans reclaimed power (Fig. 1 ). Due to Republican political dominance during this period, the overall average tariff rate between 1867 and 1932 was 41.9 percent, or almost 50 percent higher than the 28.4 percent average rate set by Democrats when they had the political power to do so ( Figure 1 . Major U.S. Tariff Acts and Average Tariff Rates, 18671932
Acts. In his first months as Secretary of State, Hull focused disproportionate attention on trade matters, perhaps even inappropriately so, given the U.S. diplomatic tensions with Russia, Japan,and Cuba in 1933. 18 Thus, although the RTAA originated in the Executive branch, it was the work of this longtime Democratic legislator, who was deeply familiar with the tariffsetting process and uniquely positioned in 1934 to make significant tariff change a reality.
As a Congressman and Senator, Hull had made two major efforts to permanently lower tariffs. First, he was an architect of the Democrats 1913 federal income tax, intended to reduce government reliance on tariff duties as the main source of revenue and thereby remove one of the main political justifications for protectionism. Second, Hull also sat on the 1916 Ways and Means Committee that created the Tariff Commission, intended to lower voters tariff preferences with credible, expert information on the consumer welfare costs of protectionism.
19 When both the income tax and the Tariff Commission failed to constrain Republican protectionism in the 1920s and 1930s, Hull pressed ahead with the RTAA in his new role as Secretary of State.
Hull was not acting alone in 1934, however; nor was he the only veteran of the earlier Democratic attempts to permanently lower tariffs. Indeed, many congressional Democratic supporters of the federal income tax and the Tar 20 All had previously tried and failed to constrain Republican protectionism, and all had another opportunity to do so during the 73d Congress.
Hull drafted the first version of the RTAA in early 1933, and Roosevelt announced on April 2 that he would pursue tariff legislation during the first session of the 73d Congress, but Roosevelt ultimately refused to send the bill to Congress. Roosevelts priority during his first year as President was the National Recovery Act, and he feared that introducing tariff legislation would jeopardize its passage. Roosevelts legislative priorities were influenced by economic nationalists within his cabinet, such as In late December 1933, Roosevelt announced he would submit the RTAA during the second session of the 73d Congress. 23 Roosevelts decision to pursue the RTAA occurred just two weeks after Hulls widely publicized resolutions at the Pan American Conference in Montevideo, Uruguay, were unanimously adopted by the twenty-one participating nations, and just days after the highly praised conference ended. 24 Indeed, the favorable publicity the Montevideo conference and Hull received was in stark contrast to the negative press received by Moley at Junes London World Economic Conference. 25 Moley was one of the RTAAs most vocal critics within Roosevelts cabinet, and Moleys unsuccessful handling of the London Conference and Hulls successful performance at Montevideo no doubt helped change Roosevelts mind on the RTAA. Notably, during the same radio address in which Roosevelt announced his intention to seek trade legislation, he also praised Hulls leadership at Montevideo. Hulls star was clearly rising within the Roosevelt cabinet. Upon Hulls return in January 1934, he immediately set to work on a draft of the RTAA. 26 In early February, Hull summarized the accomplishments of the Montevideo conference at a well-publicized National Press Club address and laid out the RTAA. 27 At the end of the month, Roosevelt brought congressional leaders to the White House to hammer out the final form of the bill and on 2 March he submitted the RTAA, together with a message written by Hull, to Congress.
In Congress, the RTAA was an unusual tariff bill, not only in its content but also in the speed with which it moved through Congress. Within two weeks, the bill had successfully passed through the Ways and Means Committee and the full Housean extraordinarily fast pace for tariff legislation. The RTAA was reported out of committee without amendments. The full House debated the bill for just five days before passing it. Republican amendments to the bill concerned (1) exemptions of specific, historically protected commodities from trade agreements, (2) limiting tariff reductions to levels equalizing production costs between U.S. and foreign producers, (3) requiring congressional ratification of all proposed trade agreements, and (4) allowing congressional rejection of any reciprocal trade agreements after a year. These amendments to dilute or restrict Presidential authority were easily defeated. 28 The only significant House floor amendment to the bill was proposed by Robert Doughton, chair of Ways and Means: the three-year renewal fuse of the RTAA was inserted to placate some legislators who were afraid Roosevelt would abuse the authority the RTAA conferred on him.
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Democrats argued during congressional debate on the bill that reciprocity would encourage lower foreign tariffs and thereby stimulate an increase in U.S. exports, especially in agricultural goods. 30 Democrats also argued that the potential for successfully concluding trade agreements would be vastly improved by doing away with Senate ratification of trade treaties and pointed to the authority to negotiate trade agreements that was granted to government ministers in most other industrialized countries as rationales for the RTAA delegation.
31 And, as in all prior tariff debates, Democrats lashed out at Republican protective tariffs on the grounds that they were unjust privileges for the wealthy. As Senator Thomas Gore (D-Okla.) noted, tariffs are paid for by the working poor, especially farmers, who [are] compelled to buy everything . . . on a protective market, and to sell everything . . . in a free market, at prices regulated by world conditions.
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Republicans primary argument against the RTAA was that the delegation of legislative authority it embodied was unconstitutional, specifically reasoning that the bill delegated to the Executive treaty-making and taxing powers that the Constitution specified as the sole domain of Congress.
33
Democrats argued in response that there were precedents for delegation of tariff-setting authority, particularly in the flexible tariff provisions of the 1922 and 1930 Tariff Acts, both of which had been upheld in legal challenges. 34 Republicans also argued that U.S. industry and labor would be pauperized by competing directly against goods and labor from low-wage countries and that there was no evidence that entering into reciprocal trade agreements would expand trade.
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Although the Senate took two months to pass the bill, it, too, moved with unusual speed. The Finance Committee added to the bill the requirement that the President provide public notice of intent to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements, to hold hearings on such proposed agreements, and to utilize the information and advice of the Tariff Commission and the State, Agriculture, and Commerce Departments in negotiating reciprocal trade agreements. 36 This was partly in response to Republican criticism that trade agreements would be negotiated behind closed doors. Senator Pat Harrison (D-Miss.) proposed the public notice amendment because he thought it would quell any remaining opposition and enable the bill to pass by almost unanimous consent.
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Full Senate debate lasted three weeks (longer than in the House) because of the discovery that a trade agreement negotiated between Colombia and the U.S. State Department in December 1933 was actually a prototype reciprocal trade agreement. Republican efforts to force the publication of this proposed treaty delayed Senate action on the RTAA. Republicans hoped to show that the Roosevelt administration planned to sacrifice certain U.S. industries to expand foreign trade. The media picked up on the story and the Colombia treaty became a hot editorial topic. However, the State Department never released the Colombia treaty prior to the RTAA vote. In the end, Republican-sponsored amendments to the bill made on the Senate floor largely echoed the House amendments, although the Senate made greater attempts to require congressional approval of all trade agreements.
38 All proposed amendments were again easily defeated.
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Predictably, industry support and opposition to the RTAA tended to be a function of the level of existing protection afforded an industry. Heavily protected industries opposed the RTAA, reasoning that their tariff protection would be lessened. Industries that were export-oriented, had minor tariff protection, or relied on heavily-dutied component parts supported the RTAA, reasoning that tariff reductions would expand their export potential or decrease their component parts costs. 40 The Ways and Means Committee received sixty-three pieces of RTAA-related correspondence from producers; fifty-nine were opposed to the bill. The industries most frequently represented included millers, textile producers, scientific instrument manufacturers, and toy makers. Cotton and wheat farmers wrote in support of the RTAA. 41 The Senate Finance Committee received seventy-four pieces of RTAA-related correspondence from producers; seventy-two were in opposition. The industries most frequently represented included the lace, wool, glass, textile, paper, and chemical industries. Export associations supported the RTAA. 42 Producer interests also wrote their individual legislators. Wool and mining interests were particularly hostile to the RTAA, while the auto industry and many agricultural segments were strong supporters. 43 The pattern of industry opposition to and support of the RTAA was consistent with the economic welfare effects of tariff protection. Protection provides protected industries and labor within those industries with an economic surplus in the form of higher profits and wages than would prevail under full competition. However, this surplus accrues at the expense of con-sumers, an issue rarely addressed by Republicans because protective tariffs transferred income from consumers and farmers (primarily Democratic constituents) to industries and workers in protected industries (primarily Republican constituents). 44 In short, Republican arguments about the economic effects of tariff protection discussed only the benefits of the policy because they accrued primarily to their constituents, while the costs were borne primarily by Democrats constituents. Democrats confronted another problem. The broadly distributed nature of protectionisms costs and the highly concentrated distribution of its pecuniary benefits made mobilization of a lowtariff political coalition difficult. The RTAA would partially unravel this dynamic, as the next section describes.
On June 12, Roosevelt signed the bill into law. A comparison of the committee hearings for the major tariff bills preceding the RTAA illustrates how fundamentally the legislative process leading to passage of the RTAA differed from the process of writing previous tariff acts (Table 3 ). Hulls and other Democrats vision became reality as the RTAA contributed to the swift and seemingly permanent decline in tariff rates illustrated in Figure 2 . By 1947, the average tariff had decreased by more than half from pre-RTAA levels, from 46.7 percent in 1934 to 19.3 percent. 45 The next section focuses on the specific features of the RTAA that ensured lower tariffs, even during a future period of unified Republican political control.
Institutionalizing Low Tariffs with the RTAA
In the short run, it was widely expected that the RTAA would lead to lower tariffs because it was known that Roosevelt favored at least some tariff liberalization, and the Democratic-controlled Congress would not reject tariff cuts. After all, the 1932 Democratic party platform advocate [d] reciprocal tariff agreements with other nations [as a way to lower tariffs and expand trade]. 46 The RTAA was primarily designed to protect against a return to high tariffs under the next period of Republican unified political control of the federal government. Three features in particular contributed to the institutionalization of low tariffs under the RTAA.
Presidential Tariff-setting. The first structural feature contributing to the durability of trade liberalization under the RTAA was the congressional delegation of trade policymaking authority to the President. Although Republican Presidents historically had favored higher tariffs than Democratic Presidents or Congresses, they had also favored lower tariffs than Republican Congresses. 47 This difference stems from the fact that the Presidents constituency is national, in contrast to the local or regional constituency served by a legislator. 48 A member of Congress is often rewarded for a tariff that protects an important industry in her district because the benefits of tariff protection, such as higher employment and economic rents in the protected industry, are concentrated in that district. The costs of protection, such as higher consumer prices and resource allocation distortions, are distributed nationally, making constituent blame for the costs of protectionism much more diffuse and politically ineffective. Delegation to the President removed agenda-setting power on tariff and trade matters from members of Congress, who are responsible only for protecting local interests, and transferred it to the one political actor responsible for national welfare, including the consumer welfare losses associated with tariff protection. As one publication observed: There is only one authority in the country that represents the transcendent public interest against a host of lesser interestsand that is the Presidency. 49 The RTAA thus established a ceiling on future tariff increases, since tariff-setting controlled by a Republican President would result in lower rates than tariff-setting controlled by a Republican Congress.
Supporters of the RTAA recognized and applauded the likely results of the congressional delegation of tariff-setting authority to the President. Hulls economic adviser, Herbert Feis, advocated Presidential tariff-making as early as 1930 because the Executive alone [can] develop a plan which represents a national outlook. 50 Many voters and industrial interests also believed Presidential tariff-setting would lead to lower tariffs. A manager at the Omaha Flour Mills opined: We all know the great difficulty of securing, through Congress, the enactment of a tariff low enough to benefit the whole nation. Only by empowering the President, unbiased by local interest, can tariffs be made for the nations good. And a representative of the Committee on Commercial Policy, a group of private citizens interested in international policy, noted: Individual Congressmen are subject to great pressure from local economic interests desiring protection, and the tendency has been to trade votes, thus bringing about a general increase in duties with little or no attention to the interests of the country as a whole. In the future [tariff legislation] should be based upon a carefully formulated determination of the interests of the nation as a whole.
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Republican opponents of the RTAA also were astute observers of the intended effects of the congressional delegation of tariff-setting authority to the President. Senator Warren Austin (R-Vt.) predicted: This measure is to be so effective in time and scope and objective as to bind the Congress . . . so that it may not . . . change the rate of duty that is established by the Chief Executive under his authority and power. Senator Frederick Steiwer (R-Ore.) correctly observed: This bill was not drawn by novices. Its very structure indicates that it was carefully formulated by someone who knew what he was doing, and it is difficult to attribute to the authors of this bill anything other than the deliberate design to accomplish [the abolition of protective tariffs]. Representative Thomas Jenkins (R-Ohio) opined that when the tariff needs to be changed, it should be changed by its friends and not by its enemies. The Roosevelt administration, congressional Democrats, and the RTAA were clearly regarded by Republicans as enemies of the protective tariff. Austin summarized the overall impact of the RTAA: Never before . . . has the President [been given the power] to create the duty, to create the form of the duty, to write the classification of the article, to fix the charges, and to apply the rates determined upon to articles produced in all foreign countries. 54 Elimination of Senate Approval of Trade Agreements. The second structural mechanism by which the RTAA institutionalized lower tariffs was the elimination of Senate approval of trade agreements. Prior to the RTAA, a trade treaty had to be preferred to the status quo trade policy by both the President and two-thirds of Senators to be ratified. After the RTAA, Congress no longer voted directly to approve trade agreements but rather took a simple majority vote every three years on whether to renew the Presidential authority conferred by the RTAA. The RTAA thus greatly reduced the political transaction costs associated with Senate ratification, as Democrats predicted during legislative debate.
Unsurprisingly, eighteen of the twenty-one trade agreements proposed during the nineteenth century failed, either because the Senate outright rejected them or because Senate amendments made the agreement unacceptable to the other country (Table 4) . 55 A 1933 Tariff Commission study of the causes for the paucity of successfully concluded trade agreements prior to the RTAA summarized: The greatest single obstacle to the completion of reciprocity arrangements appears to be the difficulty in securing the assent of two-thirds of the Senators to such arrangements. Feis also noted the difficulty of obtaining Senate ratification of trade agreements under the system of omnibus tariff-setting. Hull despised this approval process since no American Senate has ever approved a trade treaty negotiated by the Executive which materially reduced tariffs. And Senator Harry Byrd (D-Va.) expressed concern during RTAA debate that it might be amended to include Senate approval of treaties, thereby eradicating one of the main features of the bill that would result in permanent liberalization. 56 In sharp contrast to the three trade agreements ratified in the one hundred years prior to the RTAA, twenty-seven bilateral trade agreements were successfully negotiated and concluded under the RTAA in just the first the twelve years from 1934 and 1947 (Table 5) . In addition to lowering the hurdle to the successful completion trade agreements, the elimination of Senate approval of trade agreements also greatly diminished the veto power and thus the political voice of protectionists. Senate opponents were keenly aware that the RTAA would reduce their political power. In response to a pro-RTAA letter he received, Senator William Borah (R-Idaho) explained: Upon matters so vital to the interests of that part of the country in which I live, I am anxious to be heard before any [trade agreement] is consummated. In another letter, Borah demanded to know: What kind of a miserable politician would I be, having been selected by my people to represent them here, to barter away my power and surrender my influence in such matters? Indeed, Borah even attempted to organize opposition to the RTAA among his own constituents, independently writing to more than a dozen local industry leaders and urging them to organize a grassroots campaign. He suggested that they publicly frame their opposition to the RTAA by claiming that the elimination of Senate ratification was unconstitutional, although he privately conceded that the constitutionality argument was simply an elegant disguise to conceal obvious self-interest. 60 Legislators could also petition the Committee for Reciprocity Information, established by the Executive Order when Roosevelt signed the RTAA, that considered the arguments of interested parties to proposed trade agreements, but they were reduced to the same petitioner status as their constituents under this system. 61 The RTAA thus fundamentally altered the balance of power between protectionist and liberalizing interest groups and ensured that protectionists political voice would be reduced and free traders political voice amplified on future trade matters.
Protectionist interest groups also understood that their political voice, as exercised through their elected legislators, would be reduced under the RTAA. Of the fifty-nine letters opposing the RTAA that the Ways and Means committee received, twenty-five specifically mentioned the harm to protectionist interests that would result from the elimination of Senate ratification of trade agreements. 62 The Velvet Association protested to the Finance Committee: Under the [RTAA] , no industry now protected by a tariff is afforded the opportunity to be heard [by Congress] in its own defense. The most fundamental principle of democratic government is thereby completely destroyed. Many industries expressed dismay that the RTAA would place in the hands of one man [Roosevelt] the power to remove tariff protection at will and take away from citizens their property without any right to be heard . . . and without compensation. 63 Indeed, industries and legislators favoring protectionism regularly invoked in their arguments against the RTAA themes of unconstitutionality and despotism. Senator Borah called the RTAA a fascist bill in a speech that brought him a flood of congratulatory notes. 64 And one RTAA opponent was forced to concede: One might even admit that an impartial Executive could make a better tariff law than the Ways and Means Committee of Congress, but when you admit that . . . then you accept a dictatorship formula of government.
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Reciprocity. The third structural feature of the RTAA contributing to durable trade liberalization was the reciprocity of tariff reductions under the RTAA. Prior to the RTAA, U.S. tariffs were set unilaterally where tariff reductions by the U.S. did not have to be met by reciprocal reductions on the part of her trading partner. Under this system, protectionist interests had powerful, rent-seeking incentives to lobby for high rates because the benefits of tariff protection were lucrative and concentrated, while the welfare losses were broadly distributed. Conversely, export-oriented interest groups had little incentive to lobby for trade liberalization because foreign markets were not opened as a condition of U.S. tariff reductions. The reciprocal lowering of foreign trade barriers ushered in with the RTAA, however, provided a concentrated benefit to exporters from trade liberalization in the form of reduced tariff barriers in export markets. This benefit, in turn, finally gave exporters an incentive to exercise their political voice and lobby their legislators for freer trade. Over time, the lobbying by proliberalization interests would shift legislative preferences in favor of freer trade, thus ensuring the repeated extension of the RTAA and resulting in seemingly institutionalized low tariffs.
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In presenting the RTAA to Congress, Roosevelt predicted that important branches of agriculture, such as cotton, tobacco, hogs and rice, and those branches of American industry whose mass production methods have led the world, will find expanded opportunities and productive capacity in foreign markets. Many legislators agreed. Senator Arthur Capper, a progressive Kansas Republican, supported the RTAA because he believed it would open up export markets to U.S. agricultural products. Representative Henry Rainey (D-Ill.) was similarly supportive. And Representative Thomas Ford (D-Calif.) was jubilant about the RTAAs reciprocity feature and the proliberalization lobby that it might create. 67 Export-oriented interest groups also understood how vital the RTAA and its reciprocity feature were to opening up foreign markets. A representative of the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce displayed a sophisticated understanding of trade economics when he argued the RTAA would restore many of the jobs destroyed by trade strangulation in the past, and through revival of the purchasing power of our workingmen, will help to reestablish a larger domestic demand for goods of all kinds.
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Overall Liberalizing Impact of RTAA. Significantly, Hull considered the RTAA his greatest political achievement among a long list of notable politi-cal victories. In his memoirs, Hull indicates his belief that the RTAA was the solution to the problem of Republican high tariffs:
The life of a man in politics is a series of conflicts. I have had my full share, but none was . . . more successful and important than the fight for the Trade Agreements. I was 36 years old when in my maiden address in Congress I pleaded for lower tariffs and fewer trade restrictions. I was 62 years old when in 1934 we finally won the fight to reduce them, after our temporary victory with the Underwood Act of 1913 which . . . the Republicans promptly tore to pieces when they came to power in 1921.
Similarly, Representative John Rankin (D-Miss.) felt the RTAA provided a splendid opportunity to permanently readjust [the United States] international trade, which [had] been destroyed by the short-sighted [protectionist] policies of former administrations. In 1940, Hull predicted that, if the RTAA were not renewed that year, there would be a return to the embargo tariffs of the Hawley-Smoot regime or their equivalent, and to a process of iniquitous log-rolling on tariff adjustments. 69 The RTAA was clearly regarded as the permanent solution to protectionismby both Democrats and Republicansor else the battles over the RTA Extension Acts would not have been so hotly fought. 70 In conclusion, existing explanations for the RTAA are necessary but not entirely sufficient to explain this remarkable congressional delegation of policymaking authority to the President. While it is true that Democrats hoped to stimulate the economy with the RTAA, as the lesson hypothesis asserts, and that Roosevelt provided strong policy leadership which congressional Democrats often followed, as the crisis explanation posits, these explanations for the RTAA are incomplete. And, although Hulls passionate advocacy of the RTAA was critical to its passage, Hulls tenacity alone does not explain congressional support of such a broad delegation of power. What did Democratic legislators gain by giving away tariff-setting and trade agreement approval powers? This article argues that the RTAA was an attempt to finally provide durability to Democrats preferred low-tariff policy after seven decades of Republican tariff policy dominance. Moreover, this attempt has been highly successful, as the seemingly permanent trade liberalization since the RTAA demonstrates. Finally, the most remarkable feature of the RTAA is that it simultaneously advanced so many different political goals: the Executive branchs desire for foreign economic policymaking power, industrys demand for expanded export markets, and Democratic legislators desire to end seven decades of failing to deliver consistent, low tariffs to their constituents.
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